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NATIONAL INJUNCTIONS: WHAT DOES 
THE FUTURE HOLD? 
SUZETTE MALVEAUX∗ 
This year the 27th Annual Ira C. Rothgerber Conference 
brought scholars and lawyers from all over the country to discuss 
one of the most salient legal issues today—the propriety of na-
tional injunctions. Federal district court judges are increasingly 
halting the executive branch from enforcing its signature poli-
cies nationwide—fashioning remedies that go beyond the parties 
and the court’s usual geographic purview. 
National injunctions have touched the lives of many of us. 
They run the gamut, enjoining policies ranging from environ-
mental protection to immigration policies to civil rights protec-
tions.1 They have undermined the policies of both Democratic 
and Republican Administrations, such as Obama’s Deferred Ac-
tion for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
program2 and Trump’s travel ban.3 Although national injunc-
tions are not new, this remedy has recently proliferated in 
response to unprecedented challenges to the rule of law and to 
Constitutional norms under the Trump Administration. 
There is a robust debate taking place over the power and 
role of the courts in these troubling times. That debate has in-
 
∗Provost Professor of Civil Rights Law, Director of the Byron R. White Center for 
the Study of American Constitutional Law, University of Colorado Law School. 
 1. For example, one of the most familiar national injunctions was a federal 
district court judge’s preliminary injunction against the Trump Administration’s 
third travel ban on immigrants arriving from predominantly Muslim countries. 
Trump v. Hawaii, 128 St. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). Another example was an injunction 
against the Obama Administration’s enforcement of guidelines regarding 
transgender students’ bathroom use in public schools. Texas v. United States, 201 
F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
 2. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604, 676 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) 
(mem.). 
 3. Trump v. Hawaii, 128 St. Ct. at 2423. 
MALVEAUX_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2020  10:03 AM 
780 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
cluded academics, practitioners, politicians, and judges.4 The 
Justice Department, President, and Supreme Court Justices 
have even weighed in.5 Thus, it seemed only fitting for the Byron 
R. White Center for the Study of American Constitutional Law 
to host some of the top thought leaders on the subject here at the 
University of Colorado to continue that conversation. 
With our own Attorney General, Phil Weiser, providing key 
remarks and almost a dozen scholars and lawyers presenting 
their works on the future of national injunctions, the University 
of Colorado Law Review is proud to bring you this symposium 
issue. Following is a glimpse into the diverse views and inspiring 
work to which we were exposed that day. I hope it whets your 
appetite to keep reading and thinking about this critical and 
timely constitutional issue. 
PANEL I: COURT AUTHORITY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The first panel started with the threshold question of 
whether Article III and traditional equity limit the federal 
courts’ ability to issue national injunctions. Having answered 
that question in the affirmative, our opening panelists explored 
the policy implications of calls for an outright prohibition of na-
tional injunctions, recommended limiting principles to guide 
 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 2425–28 (Thomas, J., concurring); Spencer E. Amdur & 
David Hausman, Response, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 
HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the 
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Amanda Frost, In Defense of 
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018); Zachary D. Clopton, 
National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2019); Suzette M. 
Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 56 (2017); Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and 
the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Mila Sohoni, 
The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020); Alan 
M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67 (2018); 
Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions are Really “Universal” 
Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018); 
Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Civil Litigating 
Components U.S. Att’ys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the Possibility 
of Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1093881/download [hereinafter Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide 
Injunctions] [https://perma.cc/B64W-EQHH]. 
 5. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2425–28 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 4; 
Statement on Sanctuary Cities, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-sanctuary-cities-ruling/ 
[https://perma.cc/W5LJ-F3XA]. 
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court discretion when selecting this remedy, and situated the 
spike in national injunctions in a larger political context to bet-
ter explain the remedy’s role. 
As an initial matter, Professor Alan Trammell debunks the 
notion that national injunctions are not authorized by Article III 
of the Constitution.6 He contends that critics have it wrong: 
while plaintiffs must prove standing as it pertains to injury and 
remedy, once this constitutional hurdle is cleared, their job is 
done. The standing inquiry ends and the proper scope of the rem-
edy begins. Trammell rejects the contention that judicial power 
is equivalent to dispute resolution between parties; quite the 
contrary, Article III does not require such a cramped interpreta-
tion of court authority. Consequently, court judgments may bind 
nonparties. 
After putting this initial constitutional matter to bed, Tram-
mell demonstrates how national injunctions (whether a rel-
atively modern phenomenon or a traditional practice) have 
emerged as part of a larger reordering of the relationship be-
tween citizens and government. Far from being an aberration, 
this powerful remedy is an outgrowth of a larger reconceptual-
ization and expansion of the federal courts’ role in vindicating 
substantive rights. The development of the modern class-action 
device to curb desegregation, the modern interpretation of sec-
tion 1983 to hold government actors accountable for constitu-
tional civil rights violations, and the nascent structural reform 
injunctions of the 1960s signal that the growth of national in-
junctions is part and parcel of a larger societal phenomenon. 
While Trammell acknowledges the challenges national injunc-
tions impose, he strongly objects to the constitutional argument 
against them, concluding that “manufacturing a constitutional 
home for the objections to nationwide injunctions distorts and 
impoverishes Article III.”7 
Professor Doug Rendleman supports the notion that federal 
judges are empowered to issue national injunctions, relying on 
traditional equity as a source of that power in addition to the 
Constitution.8 He contends that equitable jurisdiction fuels 
 
 6. Alan Trammell, Assistant Prof. of Law, Univ. of Ark. Sch. of Law, 
Rothgerber Conference (Apr. 5, 2019). 
 7. Alan M. Trammell, The Constitutionality of Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 975, 978 (2020). 
 8. Doug Rendleman, Prof. of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Rothgerber 
Conference (Apr. 5, 2019). 
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court discretion to order relief beyond the parties. Rendleman 
reminds us that since the seminal Marbury v. Madison,9 judges 
have been empowered—if not called—to discern and declare fed-
eral laws and executive policies unconstitutional and to grant 
injunctions that stop their enforcement. This judicial check on 
abuse of power is particularly important given the current ad-
ministration’s pattern of flouting constitutional norms and rule 
of law. While recognizing the separation-of-powers function of 
national injunctions, Rendleman advocates a variety of limiting 
principles that should guide and constrain the issuance of such 
extraordinary relief. 
With the question of what the court can do to provide com-
plete relief, the conversation of our first panel turned to what 
the court should do. Much of the current debate over the propri-
ety of national injunctions has centered around the policy impli-
cations of such relief. This is where my scholarship enters the 
conversation. Weighing the pros and cons of national injunc-
tions, I reject a bright-line prohibition against them—a proposal 
recently advocated by some academics10 and adopted by the 
Trump Administration.11 While recognizing the remedy’s poten-
tial drawbacks—such as incentivizing forum shopping and trun-
cating law development—I conclude that an outright prohibition 
is too blunt an instrument to address the complexity of the prob-
lem. On the other side of the ledger is the judiciary’s duty (not 
just capacity) to do justice. I argue that not only are national 
injunctions efficient and fair—and that they promote the rule of 
law—but under some circumstances, they are the only way to 
prevent irreparable harm to those most vulnerable in our soci-
ety, especially under the current administration. 
Professor Charlton Copeland concluded our first panel by 
contextualizing the recent bump in national injunctions as a nat-
ural response to shifting power in the American political sys-
tem.12 More specifically, Copeland explores the relationship be-
tween Congressional partisan paralysis, increased unilateral 
executive action, and the subsequent surge in national injunc-
tions. Copeland challenges us to move away from a court-centric 
analysis and to instead recognize the significant role other insti-
 
 9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 10. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 4. 
 11. See, e.g., Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 4. 
 12. Charlton Copeland, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, Rothgerber 
Conference (Apr. 5, 2019). 
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tutional actors play in explaining the boost in national injunc-
tions. From this wide-angle lens, Copeland invites us to consider 
how the national injunction reflects the separation-of-powers 
balance between the branches of government. From this perch, 
Copeland concludes that more is going on than judges merely 
perceiving their roles beyond umpires calling balls and strikes. 
Greater legislative gridlock and an increasing executive appetite 
for power may help explain the current struggle. 
PANEL II: LESSONS FROM VARIOUS MODELS 
The second panel explored how various analogs, doctrines, 
and laws can inform the national injunction debate. Panelists 
analogized the national injunction to issue preclusion, proposed 
alternative procedural doctrine for achieving the goals of the na-
tional injunction, and examined a federal statute that suggests 
appropriate constraints on national injunctions. 
Similar to my own argument, our first panelist, Professor 
Zachary D. Clopton, contends that the legitimacy of national in-
junctions is neither a constitutional nor a historical question but 
rather a policy one.13 Clopton thus turns to either Congress or 
the Supreme Court as the antidote, asking them to change 
course in their preferential treatment of the federal government 
as defendant. Clopton cleverly draws from the doctrine of offen-
sive nonmutual collateral estoppel to respond to procedure-
based criticism of the national injunction. He points to United 
States v. Mendoza, in which the Supreme Court exempted the 
federal government from the doctrine14—which, like national in-
junctions, allows judgments to benefit nonparties. Clopton 
concludes that Mendoza should be reconsidered and overruled 
because the policy concerns on which it is based are dubious and 
in fact weigh in favor of the national injunction. 
Like Clopton, the second panelist, Professor Michael T. Mor-
ley, looks to alternative doctrine that might help inform the de-
bate over the propriety of national injunctions.15 Morley seeks 
to find other procedural mechanisms that would enable nonpar-
ties to benefit from a federal court’s rulings without the familiar 
 
 13. Zachary D. Clopton, Prof. of Law, Northwestern Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law, 
Rothgerber Conference (Apr. 5, 2019). 
 14. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
 15. Michael T. Morley, Assistant Prof. of Law, Fla. State Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Rothgerber Conference (Apr. 5, 2019). 
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attendant baggage. One such mechanism is the Rule 23(b)(2) in-
junctive class action,16 complete with due process protections. 
Morley rejects the conclusion that this class action device re-
quires indivisibility and offers this aggregation device as a salve 
to the current national injunction problem. While at first blush 
the class action seems an ideal solution, Morley ultimately con-
cedes it is a problematic substitute in light of various issues, in-
cluding difficulty ascertaining the class, lack of notice and opt-
out rights, and standing concerns. 
Morley thus suggests a variety of other doctrinal reforms. 
He lands on giving district- or circuit-wide stare decisis effect to 
district court rulings as the antidote. In addition to his prescrip-
tion, Morley offers a helpful nomenclature to more accurately 
describe what is often termed the “nationwide injunction.”17 
More precisely, he identifies the “nationwide defendant-oriented 
injunction” as the target of the current debate.18 
The third and final panelist, David Hausman, brings the 
critical perspective of a practitioner to the table as an ACLU 
Skadden Fellow and attorney in Trump v. Hawaii.19 Hausman 
argues that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) illus-
trates two important concepts relevant to the debate over the 
propriety of national injunctions: (1) the district courts’ power to 
order national injunctions and (2) potential ameliorative mech-
anisms for national injunction orders.  
A word first about the statute itself. One provision prevents 
systemic challenges to expedited removal—the process by which 
individuals who have recently arrived in the United States are 
deported on a fast track—from proceeding as class actions.20 
This statutory provision, instead, permits an individual to seek 
nationwide relief.21 The statute requires that such non-class 
systemic challenges be brought in the federal district court for 
the District of Columbia within sixty days of a policy change.22 
 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 17. Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 
1, 28 (2019). 
 18. Id. at 10, 28. 
 19. David Hausman, Skadden Fellow, ACLU Immigrants Rights Project, 
Rothgerber Conference (Apr. 5, 2019); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018). 
 20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B), (e)(3) (2018). 
 21. See id. § 1252(e)(3). 
 22. See id. 
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While Hausman does not offer the INA as a blueprint for 
national injunctions, he does rely on the statute to highlight two 
salient ideas: (1) Congress has unflinchingly recognized that dis-
trict court judges have the power to issue a national injunction 
under certain circumstances as an alternative to class actions, 
and (2) a national injunction ban is unnecessary where safe-
guards are put in place. More specifically, the INA’s forum selec-
tion clause23 eliminates the problems of forum shopping and 
inconsistent rulings—two of the biggest criticisms of national in-
junctions today. Hausman reminds us of the importance of crea-
tivity when devising solutions to the challenges posed by the 
national injunction. 
PANEL III: OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL INJUNCTIONS 
The third and final panel of the symposium took us from the 
bird’s-eye view to a wide-angle lens, calling into question various 
conceptions of the national injunction. The panelists challenged 
the accuracy of the prevailing historical narrative of national in-
junctions; questioned the nomenclature used to describe the de-
bate over national injunctions; interrogated federal-govern-
ment-defendant exceptionalism as a justification for the 
opposition to national injunctions; and warned progressives of 
relying on the national injunction for making meaningful 
change. 
Our first panelist, Professor Mila Sohoni, interrupts the 
common narrative that national injunctions came on the scene 
in the 1960s and thus are of relatively recent vintage.24 Critics 
of the national injunction point to a long history of Article III 
and traditional equity that does not seem to include this novel 
remedy. Sohoni, however, calls into question this familiar nar-
rative, identifying such injunctions as to state laws that date 
back more than a century.25 And for injunctions as to federal 
law, they too date back as far back as 1939,26 seven years prior 
to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. Sohoni 
resurrects the lost history of the national injunction and offers 
 
 23. See id. 
 24. Mila Sohoni, Prof. of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Rothgerber 
Conference (Apr. 5, 2019). 
 25. Sohoni, supra note 4, at 921–22; see id., at 982–93 (describing seven state 
cases from 1916 to 1934). 
 26. Id. at 925 (citing Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1939)). 
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an important counter-narrative to the remedy’s short pedigree 
and exceptionalism. Her revelations deftly undermine critics’ 
contentions that the federal courts lack the power to issue such 
broad relief today. Her work attempts to set the historical record 
straight. 
Our next panelist, Professor Howard Wasserman, chal-
lenges us to break from the common terminology used to de-
scribe the remedy at the heart of public debate.27 He notes that 
the real problem is the scope of non-class-action injunctions’ en-
forcement vis-à-vis nonparties, not their territorial scope. Was-
serman contends that the conflation of “who” and “where” leads 
to confusion about what is at the heart of the current contro-
versy. He, like others, instead embraces the term “universal” 
over “national” or “nationwide” to describe the injunction that is 
at issue. After this initial brush-clearing, Wasserman offers an-
other distinction that is important to the analysis: the difference 
between a judgment and an opinion—the former which applies 
to the parties in a case and the latter which provides the under-
lying rationale for future actions and eventually forms the basis 
for precedent. Finally, Wasserman explores whether universal 
declaratory judgments rather than injunctions solve the current 
controversy, and he concludes that the former should be as par-
ticularized as the latter. He argues that executive discretion and 
institutional incentives, not judicial supremacy, play key roles 
in the cessation of the enforcement of laws deemed unconstitu-
tional. 
Like Wasserman, our third panelist, Professor Portia Pedro, 
decries the debate over the misnomered “nationwide injunction,” 
but for different reasons.28 Her opposition comes from the fail-
ure of commentators to include in the term their exclusion of pri-
vate defendants. The debate, as commonly framed, focuses solely 
on injunctions that run against the federal government. This 
omission suggests the propriety of treating the federal gov-
ernment differently as a defendant. She asks why such govern-
ment-defendant exceptionalism should exist. With the debate re-
framed as such, Pedro warns of the danger of federal courts not 
being able to check the power of their executive and legislative 
sister branches. 
 
 27. Howard Wasserman, Assoc. Dean for Research & Faculty Dev., Prof. of 
Law, Fla. Int’l Univ. Coll. of Law, Rothgerber Conference (April 5, 2019). 
 28. Portia Pedro, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Rothgerber 
Conference (April 5, 1019). 
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Our final panelist, Professor Ahmed White, sounds a differ-
ent type of warning—here, directed specifically to liberals who 
seek to use national injunctions as a means of safeguarding de-
mocracy and achieving progressive agendas.29 White reminds us 
of the painful history of the American worker: how, in their effort 
to organize labor and unionize, workers were thrown into jail 
and subjected to “government by injunctions.” National injunc-
tions in labor disputes were used to end strikes and put radicals 
like Eugene Debs in “their place.” White contends that the his-
tory of American labor relations reveals injunctions to be funda-
mentally anti-democratic and repressive and the judges that 
issue them to be political guardians of powerful interests. White 
is skeptical that judges—bathed in wealth, power, and privi-
lege—will adequately protect the interests of those most vulner-
able in our society, such as immigrants, children, and 
transgender individuals. White cautions liberals to wean them-
selves from the notion that the courts are their friends and to 
realize that progressive judicial decisions stem from a dubious 
convergence of interests. 
In sum, the propriety of national injunctions (if you even call 
them that) is complex and long standing. The future is uncer-
tain. Much gratitude goes to the participants of the 27th Annual 
Rothgerber Conference for their insights, labor, brilliance, and 
time shared together. Many of us continued the discussion well 
into the breaks and the closing reception—a testament to the 
passion and conflicting perspectives we brought to the issue. 
And then we let it go, as we hiked the Colorado mountains that 
evening—a testament to our mutual friendship and respect for 
one another, despite our differing views. I trust you too will enjoy 
the immense contributions our participants are making in this 




Suzette M. Malveaux 
Provost Professor of Civil Rights Law 
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 29. Ahmed White, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., Rothgerber Conference 
(Apr. 5, 2019). 
